Behaviour-based price discrimination with elastic demand by Esteves, Rosa Branca & Reggiani, Carlo
                             
“Behaviour-Based Price Discrimination with Elastic 
Demand” 
 
 
Rosa Branca Esteves 
Carlo Reggiani 
 
 
NIPE WP 14/ 2012 
“Behaviour-Based Price Discrimination with Elastic 
Demand” 
 
 
 
 
 
Rosa Branca Esteves 
Carlo Reggiani 
 
 
 
 
 
      
      
  
 
 
           NIPE
*
 WP 14/ 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
URL: 
http://www.eeg.uminho.pt/economia/nipe 
                                               
 
Behaviour-Based Price Discrimination with
Elastic Demand∗
Rosa Branca Esteves† Carlo Reggiani‡
December 2012
Abstract
Behaviour-based price discrimination is typically analysed in a
framework characterised by inelastic demand. This paper provides
a ﬁrst assessment of the role of elastic demand on the competitive ef-
fects of behaviour-based price discrimination. Our results show that if
demand is elastic enough, behaviour-based price discrimination leads
to demand expansion which has a positive eﬀect on overall welfare.
JEL: D43, L13.
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1 Introduction
Behaviour-based price discrimination (BBPD) is a very commonly adopted
business practice: ﬁrms gather information on the past shopping behaviour of
consumers and make use of it by proposing deals to new and old consumers.
The increasing diﬀusion of internet as a marketplace and the unprecedented
ability to store huge amount of data is enhancing ﬁrms’ knowledge of con-
sumers’ preferences and, consequently, the predominance of this type of prac-
tices. Examples of ﬁrms using BBPD include supermarkets, web retailers,
telecom companies, restaurants and many others.
One characteristic of BBPD in most of these examples is that consumers’
decision does not only involve choosing a ﬁrm but also the amount of good(s)
∗Any errors are our own. Financial support from Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnolo-
gia is gratefully acknowledged.
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purchased. The existing literature on the topic, instead, has mainly focused
on the case in which consumers’ demand is inelastic: each consumer decides
whether to consume or not the good supplied but not how many units of
it. This paper relaxes this assumption and introduces elastic demand in the
context of BBPD.
The economics literature on BBPD is relatively new but has already suc-
cessfully explained a number of practices that the standard categories of price
discrimination could not capture. The seminal paper of Fudenberg and Ti-
role (2000) has ﬁrst shown that ﬁrms have an incentive to poach consumers
although this is reducing their proﬁts.
A common assumption adopted by this literature is that ﬁrms are com-
peting in a unit demand framework à la Hotelling: the implication is that
the role of demand elasticity on the competitive eﬀects of BBPD has been
mostly overlooked. The assumption may be justiﬁed by the challenge posed
by elastic demand in a Hotelling framework. Nero (1999) and Rath and Zhao
(2001) seem to be the ﬁrst to tackle the issue. They use quadratic utility
preferences to show that a location than price Hotelling game with elastic
demand has a unique equilibrium. Both papers emphasise the role of the
transport cost to reservation price ratio in determining the optimal location
chosen by ﬁrms. Anderson and De Palma (2000) introduce constant elas-
ticity of substitution (CES) utility in a spatial framework to analyse issues
related to localized and global competition. Wenzel and Guo (2009, 2011)
use the same system of preferences to address the optimality of ﬁrm entry in
spatial models and the role of information and transparency on the variety
supplied by the market, respectively.
In this paper we also adopt a CES utility function to introduce elastic
demand in the analysis of competitive BBPD. These preferences allow us
to provide a closed form solution to a two periods BBPD model with elas-
tic demand. Moreover, our results conﬁrm that the assumption of inelastic
demand may not be so innocuous. In particular, price discrimination is ben-
eﬁcial to consumers’ independently of the eﬀect of BBPD on average prices;
the demand expansion eﬀect of BBPD always increases consumers’ surplus.
Unlike the inelastic case, in our context the demand expansion eﬀect also im-
plies that BBPD can be welfare enhancing: if demand is suﬃciently elastic,
the higher volume of transactions more than compensates for the increase in
transport costs.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the
model. Section 3 sets the benchmark case with no discrimination. Section 4
solves the model when ﬁrms practice behaviour based price discrimination.
Section 5 discusses the implications of BBPD and Section 6 concludes.
2
2 The model
Two ﬁrms, i = A,B, produce at zero marginal cost1 a nondurable good and
compete over two periods, t = 1, 2. On the demand side, there is a large
number of consumers whose mass is normalized to one. In each period a
consumer can either decide to buy the good from ﬁrm A or from ﬁrm B, but
not from both. We assume that the two ﬁrms are located at the extremes
of a unit interval [0, 1] , and consumers are uniformly distributed along this
interval. A consumer situated at x ∈ [0, 1] is at a distance dA(x) = x from
ﬁrm A and at distance dB(x) = 1−x from ﬁrm B and τ is the unit transport
cost. Transport cost is linear in distance and does not depend on the quantity
purchased. Note that the location of a consumer x represents his relative
preference for ﬁrm B over A while τ > 0 measures how much a consumer
dislikes buying a less preferred brand. A consumer’s brand preference x
remains ﬁxed for both periods. Following Anderson and De Palma (2000)
and Gu and Wenzel (2009, 2011), we write the utility of a consumer buying
from ﬁrm i as:
Ui(x) = v − V (qi)− τdi(x)− piqi,
in which v is the gross utility of consuming the good, V (qi) is the utility de-
rived by consuming qi units of the good, tdi(x) is the total transport cost of
buying from ﬁrm i and piqi is the consumer’s expenditure. We shall assume
throughout that the reservation value is high enough that all consumers pur-
chase in both periods. Assuming preferences display constant elasticity of
substitution, type-x consumers’ net utility of buying qA units from ﬁrm A at
the marginal price pA can be written as:
UA = v −
1− σ
σ
q
−
σ
1−σ
A − τx− pAqA = v −
1
σ
pσA − τx,
where qi = p
1−σ
i and σ ∈ (0, 1]. Notice that this demand speciﬁcation en-
compasses the standard Hotelling setup as σ = 1 and perfect competition as
σ → 0. Similarly, if consumer x buys qB units form ﬁrm B, the net utility is:
v − 1
σ
pσB − τ(1 − x). These preferences imply that the consumer indiﬀerent
between buying from ﬁrm A or B is located at x = 1
2
+
pσ
B
−pσ
A
2τσ
. Firms demand
are given by DA = xp
σ−1
A and DB = (1− x) p
σ−1
B while proﬁts are πA = xp
σ
A
and πB = (1− x) p
σ
B respectively. In each period ﬁrms act simultaneously
and non-cooperatively. In the ﬁrst period, consumers are anonymous and
ﬁrms quote the same price for all consumers. In the second period, whether
or not a consumer bought from the ﬁrm in the initial period reveals that
1The assumption of zero marginal costs can be relaxed without altering the basic nature
of the results derived throughout the model.
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consumer’s brand preference. Thus, as ﬁrms have the required information,
they will set diﬀerent prices to their own customers and to the rival’s pre-
vious customers. If price discrimination is not adopted (for example, if it
is forbidden) ﬁrms quote again a single price to all consumers. Firms and
consumers discount future proﬁts using a common discount factor δ ∈ [0, 1].
3 Benchmark: no discrimination
Suppose that for some reason (e.g. regulation, costs of changing prices...)
ﬁrms in the second period can not price discriminate. In that case, the two-
period model reduces to two replications of the static equilibrium. To solve
for this equilibrium, consider the one period model, and let pA and pB denote
the prices set by ﬁrms A and B, respectively. Firm A solves the following
problem:
max
pA
πA =

pσA

1
2
+
pσB − p
σ
A
2τσ

.
From the ﬁrst-order condition, the best response function is:
pA =

τσ + pσB
2
 1
σ
.
Firm B’s best response function, similarly, is:
pB =

τσ + pσA
2
 1
σ
.
Solving for the equilibrium, the following proposition can be stated (without
proof):
Proposition 1 In the no discrimination benchmark case equilibrium prices
in each period are equal to:
pnd = (τσ)
1
σ ,
and each consumer buys:
qnd = (τσ)
σ−1
σ .
The industry equilibrium proﬁts are:
Πnd = (1 + δ) τσ.
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4 Behaviour-based price discrimination
Price discrimination is now feasible. In period 1 ﬁrms cannot recognise cus-
tomers so they set a single ﬁrst period price, denoted p1i . Consumers’ ﬁrst
period choices reveal information about their brand preferences, so ﬁrms can
set their second period prices accordingly: in the second period, each ﬁrm
can oﬀer two prices, one to its own past customers, denoted poi , and another
price to the rival’s previous customers, denoted pri . To derive the subgame
perfect equilibrium, the game is solved using backward induction from the
second period.
4.1 Second-period pricing
As in Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) the consumers ﬁrst-period decisions will
lead to a cut-oﬀ rule, so that ﬁrst-period sales identify two intervals of con-
sumers, corresponding to each ﬁrm’s turf. Suppose that at given ﬁrst-period
prices p1A and p
1
B, there is a cut-oﬀ x
∗
1 such that all consumers with x < x
∗
1
bought from ﬁrm A in period 1. Thus, ﬁrm A’s turf is the interval [0, x∗1] ,
while ﬁrm B’s turf is the remaining [x∗1, 1] . On ﬁrm A’s turf (i.e. ﬁrm A’s
strong market and ﬁrm B’s weak market), ﬁrm A oﬀers price poA, while ﬁrm
B oﬀers price prB. The marginal consumer, x2A who is indiﬀerent between
buying again from ﬁrm A and switching to ﬁrm B is identiﬁed by the follow-
ing condition:
1
σ
pσoA + τx2A =
1
σ
pσrB + τ(1− x2A),
implying:
x2A =
1
2
+
pσrB − p
σ
oA
2τσ
.
Each consumer in the market segment [0, x2] buys qoA = p
σ−1
oA units from
ﬁrm A in the second period and each consumer in the market segment
[x2, x
∗
1] switches to ﬁrm B in period 2 and buys qrB = p
σ−1
rB units. Thus,
ﬁrm A’s demand from retained customers in period 2 is given by DoA =
x2Ap
σ−1
oA and, similarly, ﬁrm B’s demand from switching customers is: DrB =
(x∗1 − x2A) p
σ−1
rB .
Firm A’s second period proﬁt from old customers is:
πoA = poADoA = x2Ap
σ
oA =

1
2
+
pσrB − p
σ
oA
2τσ

pσoA,
and ﬁrm B’s second period proﬁt from switching customers is
πrB = prBDrB = (x
∗
1 − x2A) p
σ
rB =

x1 −
1
2
−
pσrB − p
σ
oA
2τσ

pσrB.
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On its turf, ﬁrm A chooses poA to maximise πoA for any given prB leading to
the following best response function:
poA =

τσ + pσrB
2
 1
σ
,
Firm B’s best response function on ﬁrm A’s turf is instead:
prB =

τσ (2x1 − 1) + p
σ
oA
2
 1
σ
.
Solving for the equilibrium and using an analogous reasoning for ﬁrm B ﬁrst
period turf leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 2 When ﬁrms can recognise their old and the rivals’ customers
and price discriminate second-period equilibrium prices and quantities are:
(i) if 1
4
≤ x1 ≤
3
4
:
poA =

τσ (2x1 + 1)
3
 1
σ
and prA =

τσ (3− 4x1)
3
 1
σ
,
qoA =

τσ (2x1 + 1)
3
σ−1
σ
and qrA =

τσ (3− 4x1)
3
σ−1
σ
,
and:
poB =

τσ (3− 2x1)
3
 1
σ
and prB =

τσ (4x1 − 1)
3
 1
σ
,
qoB =

τσ (3− 2x1)
3
σ−1
σ
and qrB =

τσ (4x1 − 1)
3
σ−1
σ
.
(ii) if x1 ≤
1
4
:
poA = [τσ (1− 2x1)]
1
σ and prA =

τσ (3− 4x1)
3
 1
σ
,
qoA = [τσ (1− 2x1)]
σ−1
σ and qrA =

τσ (3− 4x1)
3
σ−1
σ
,
poB =

τσ (3− 2x1)
3
 1
σ
and prB = 0,
qoB =

τσ (3− 2x1)
3
σ−1
σ
and qrB = 0.
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(iii) if x1 ≥
3
4
:
poA =

τσ (2x1 + 1)
3
 1
σ
and prA = 0,
qoA =

τσ (2x1 + 1)
3
σ−1
σ
and qrA = 0,
poB = [τσ(2x1 − 1)]
1
σ and prB =

τσ (4x1 − 1)
3
 1
σ
,
qoB = [τσ(2x1 − 1)]
σ−1
σ and qrB =

τσ (4x1 − 1)
3
σ−1
σ
.
Proof See Appendix.
4.2 First-period pricing
Consider now the equilibrium ﬁrst-period pricing and consumption decisions.
If ﬁrms have no commitment power, their market shares in the ﬁrst period
will aﬀect their second period pricing and proﬁts. Thus, forward looking
ﬁrms take this interdependence into account when setting their ﬁrst period
prices. As consumers are not myopic they anticipate the ﬁrms’ second period
behaviour. Suppose the ﬁrst-period prices lead to a cut-oﬀ x1 that is in the
interior of the interval [0, 1] then the marginal consumer must be indiﬀerent
between buying q1A units in the ﬁrst period at price p1A, and buying qrB
units next period at the poaching price prB, or buying q1B units in the ﬁrst
period at price p1B, and switching to buy qrA units in the second period at
the poaching price prA. Hence, at an interior solution x1 must satisfy:
v−
1
σ
pσ1A−τx1+δ

v −
1
σ
pσrB − τ (1− x1)

= v−
1
σ
pσ1B−τ (1− x1)+δ

v −
1
σ
pσrA − τx1)

,
implying:
x1 =
1
2
+
pσ1B − p
σ
1A
2στ (1− δ)
+
δ
2στ (1− δ)
(pσrA − p
σ
rB) , (1)
in which prA and prB are given by the expressions in Proposition 1. Note
that when x1 =
1
2
it follows that prB = prA if and only if p1A = p1B. First
period proﬁts can be written as:
π1A = p1AD1A = p1Ax1p
σ−1
1A = x1p
σ
1A, (2)
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for ﬁrm A and:
π1B = p1BD1B = p1B (1− x1) p
σ−1
1B = (1− x1) p
σ
1B, (3)
for ﬁrm B respectively. We are now able to characterize ﬁrms’ ﬁrst period
problem. Firm A, for example, chooses p1A to maximizes overall proﬁts:
max
p1A
πA = π1A + δπ2A,
recalling that: π2A (x1 (p1A, p1B)) = x2Ap
σ
oA + (x2B − x1) p
σ
rA. Solving the
problem, allows us to state:
Proposition 3 There is a symmetric Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium in
which: (i) ﬁrst-period equilibrium price and quantity purchased are respec-
tively given by
p1 =

τσ

1 +
δ
3
 1
σ
,
q1 =

τσ

1 +
δ
3
σ−1
σ
.
and both ﬁrms share equally the market in period 1, thus x1 (p
1
A, p
1
B) =
1
2
;
(ii) second-period equilibrium prices and quantities are:
po =

2
3
τσ
 1
σ
, qo =

2
3
τσ
σ−1
σ
,
pr =

1
3
τσ
 1
σ
, qr =

1
3
τσ
σ−1
σ
.
Proof See Appendix.
5 Competitive eﬀects of price discrimination
and demand elasticity
The eﬀects of BBPD vis à vis non discriminatory prices can now be evalu-
ated. As previously underlined, inelastic demand is captured in our model as
a limiting case when σ = 1; in that case, our results clearly coincide with the
received literature (e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole, 2000). Hence, we shall evalu-
ate the impact of price elasticity, σ ∈ (0, 1), on prices, quantities, switching,
proﬁts, consumers’ surplus and overall welfare.
We consider prices ﬁrst. The comparison of the two pricing regimes (no
discrimination and BBPD) leads to:
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Proposition 4 (i) The following relationship between ﬁrst period, second
period and non discriminatory prices:
pr < po < p
nd ≤ p1
holds no matter the elasticity of demand, σ ∈ (0, 1]. As σ → 0 (perfectly
elastic demand): pr = po = p
nd = p1 = 0. (ii) Provided that demand is
suﬃciently elastic and consumers are patient, δ ∈ (0, 1], the average price
paid under BBPD can be higher than the non discriminatory price .
Proof See Appendix.
The relation between the prices paid by diﬀerent types of consumers is
not aﬀected by elasticity: as in Fudenberg and Tirole (2000), under BBPD
consumers are overcharged in the ﬁrst period but then strong competition
leads to reduced prices in the second period. The reduction is more pro-
nounced for switchers that need to be encouraged to buy their less favourite
good. Intuitively, the diﬀerence between the prices tends to fade out as de-
mand becomes more elastic: in the extreme case of perfect substitutability
between the goods, prices tend to the marginal cost, i.e. zero. On average,
if demand is inelastic BBPD leads to lower prices; interestingly, however, as
the elasticity increases this feature of BBPD may no longer hold: the average
price paid under BBPD can exceed the non discriminatory price. The intu-
ition is as follows: as elasticity increases the diﬀerence between prices tends
to decrease: in that case, the reduction in prices in the second period is not
suﬃcient to compensate for the increase in the ﬁrst period. The ﬁndings are
illustrated in Figure 1 and 2 that plot prices as a function of σ.
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Prices per type of consumers, δ = 1, τ = 1. No discrimination (black), ﬁrst
period (red), second period old consumers (green), second period old
consumers (blue).
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y
Average prices, δ = 1, τ = 1. No discrimination (black), BBPD (red).
Prices clearly aﬀect the quantity demanded by each type of consumer and
the overall output supplied; this leads to:
Proposition 5 If demand is elastic, σ ∈ (0, 1): (i) the following relation-
ship between the quantity demanded by each individual consumer in the ﬁrst
10
period, second period and under no discrimination (each period) holds:
q1 ≤ q
nd < qo < qr
For perfectly inelastic demand, σ = 1: q1 = q
nd = qo = qr = 1; (ii) the quan-
tity consumed by any switching consumer over the two periods Qr exceeds
the quantity consumed over the two periods by any loyal consumer Qo; more-
over, Qo exceeds the quantity consumed over the two periods by any consumer
under non discrimination Qnd; (iii) BBPD increases the aggregate quantity
consumed in the market.
Proof See Appendix.
In the inelastic benchmark (σ = 1), any given consumer demands one
unit of the good. Elastic demand, instead, implies an inverse relation be-
tween price and demand. The consequence is that switching consumers are
demanding a higher quantity, both individually and on aggregate through
the two periods. Loyal consumers, despite consuming less than switchers,
get more of the good than in case discrimination did not take place. This
holds both in the second period and over the two periods: under BBPD the
eﬀect of a lower price in the second period leads to a demand increase that
more than compensates for the higher price and lower consumption in the
ﬁrst period. In aggregate, this implies that BBPD increases overall consump-
tion over the two periods compared with no discrimination. The results are
further illustrated in Figure 3 and 4 that plot quantities as a function of σ for
δ = 1, τ = 1. δ = 1, τ = 1. In ﬁgure 3 no discrimination (black), ﬁrst period
(red), second period old consumers (green), second period new consumers
(blue). In ﬁgure 4 no discrimination (black), BBPD (red).
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0
2
4
6
8
10
x
y
Quantity per consumer per period
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Overall quantity supplied both periods
We can ﬁnally turn to the proﬁt and welfare eﬀects of BBPD.
Proposition 6 (i) Switching and the beneﬁt of consumers under BBPD
compared to no discrimination are both unaﬀected by demand elasticity; (ii)
the negative impact of BBPD on proﬁts decreases as demand becomes more
elastic; (iii) if demand is suﬃciently elastic, BBPD is welfare enhancing.
Proof See Appendix.
Some of the results of the inelastic benchmark also apply to our frame-
work: the properties of CES preferences are such that both switching and
consumers’ surplus are not aﬀected by the elasticity of demand. Hence, one
third of the total consumers switch to their least favourite ﬁrm in the sec-
ond period; moreover consumers prefer BBPD to no discrimination by. The
intuition for the latter result, however, is slightly diﬀerent. In the inelastic
benchmark, under BBPD consumers enjoy lower prices for the same amount
of goods consumed as under no discrimination; in our framework, instead, no
matter the price eﬀect of BBPD, there is also a demand expansion eﬀect that
comes into play. This implies that even if the average price increases under
BBPD, the demand expansion eﬀect linked to demand elasticity prevails.
As in the inelastic case, also in our framework BBPD leads to reduced
industry proﬁts. The reduction compared to no discrimination, however, be-
comes lower the more elastic demand is: lower prices imply reduced proﬁt
margins under both regimes and, at the extreme of perfectly elastic demand,
industry proﬁts tend to zero under both BBPD and no discrimination. This
leads to the most interesting result: if the demand is suﬃciently elastic,
BBPD may actually increase overall welfare. This is in sharp contrast with
the inelastic benchmark case. Under inelastic demand, the overall eﬀect of
BBPD is just to increase overall transport costs and, hence, reduce the welfare
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generated by the market. The result holds if demand is moderately elastic; if
elasticity increases enough (σ < 0.5) the conclusion is instead controverted.
The ineﬃciency created by increased transport costs (i.e. sub-optimal con-
sumption) is more than compensated by the increase in overall consumption
induced by the reduced proﬁt margins that ﬁrms can charge. The results
are illustrated in Figure 5 and 6 that plot overall proﬁts and welfare as a
function of σ for δ = 1, τ = 1. No discrimination (black), BBPD (red).
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Overall industry proﬁts
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Overall welfare for v = 2
6 Concluding remarks
This paper constitutes a ﬁrst assessment of the competitive eﬀects of BBPD
when ﬁrms face an elastic demand. The results suggest that BBPD can
have a positive welfare eﬀect if demand is suﬃciently elastic: the increase in
transport costs related to switching, that dominates in the standard inelastic
13
demand framework, is more than compensated by the demand expansion
eﬀect implied by the reduced prices and proﬁt margins that ﬁrms can charge
when demand is elastic. The demand expansion eﬀect, that is obviously
overlooked by the standard framework à la Hotelling, can play a very relevant
role: not only it determines the welfare eﬀects of BBPD just discussed but
it also explains why BBPD is beneﬁcial to consumers despite it may lead to
a slight increase in the average prices charged over the two periods.
A further contribution of this paper is to provide a closed form solution to
a model of competitive BBPD with elastic demand. The assumption of CES
preferences is crucial to the goal: it is convenient and elegant but it can also
be seen as a limitation of our work. Extending the analysis to diﬀerent or
more general preferences is one of the challenges of future research. Finally,
the results were derived in a two period model: a further direction for future
research may be to address competitive BBPD with elastic demand in an
inﬁnite time horizon.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
(i) The relevant demand segments are identiﬁed by:
x2A =

1
2
+
pσrB − p
σ
oA
2τσ

, (x1 − x2A) =

x1 −
1
2
+
pσoA − p
σ
rB
2τσ

,
for ﬁrm A and:
(1− x2B) =

1
2
+
pσrA − p
σ
oB
2τσ

, (x2B − x1) =

1
2
+
pσoB − p
σ
rA
2τσ
− x1

for ﬁrm B. At an interior solution it is straightforward to ﬁnd that the proﬁt
segments are:
πoA = x2Ap
σ
oA =

1
2
+
pσrB − p
σ
oA
2τσ

τσ (2x1 + 1)
3
σ
πrA = (x2B − x1) p
σ
rA =

1
2
+
pσoB − p
σ
rA
2τσ
− x1

τσ (3− 4x1)
3
σ
πoB = (1− x2B) p
σ
oB =

1
2
+
pσrA − p
σ
oB
2τσ

τσ (3− 2x1)
3
σ
πrB = (x1 − x2A) p
σ
rB =

x1 −
1
2
+
pσoA − p
σ
rB
2τσ

τσ (4x1 − 1)
3
σ
so that the second period proﬁts can be written as:
π2A (x1 (p1A, p1B)) = x2Ap
σ
oA + (x2B − x1) p
σ
rA (4)
π2B (x1 (p1A, p1B)) = (1− x2B) p
σ
oB + (x1 − x2A) p
σ
rB (5)
Standard derivations lead to the prices reported in the proposition.
(ii)
(iii)
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof of Proposition 4
(i) Consider ﬁrst p1 and p
nd. The two prices are identical if and only
if δ = 0. If δ ∈ (0, 1], the argument of p1 dominates the one of p
nd as
τσ (1 + δ/3) > τσ; applying a monotonically increasing transformation to
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both arguments does not change the relationship so ∀σ ∈ (0, 1], p1 > p
nd.
The diﬀerence between pnd and po is

1−

2
3
	 1
σ


(τσ)
1
σ > 0, ∀σ ∈ (0, 1]
implying pnd > po. A similar argument applies to po and pr, whose diﬀerence
is

2
3
	 1
σ −

1
3
	 1
σ


(τσ)
1
σ > 0, ∀σ ∈ (0, 1] implying po > pr. Finally, it is easy
to verify that:
lim
σ→0

1
3
τσ
 1
σ
= lim
σ→0

2
3
τσ
 1
σ
= lim
σ→0
(τσ)
1
σ = lim
σ→0

τσ

1 +
δ
3
 1
σ
= 0.
(ii) As there is no change between the two periods, the average non dis-
criminatory price coincides with pnd. The average price paid by consumers
under BBPD is:
pbbpd = 1
2
p1 +
1
2

1
3
pr +
2
3
po

=
1
2

τσ

1 +
δ
3
 1
σ
+
1
2

1
3

1
3
τσ
 1
σ
+
2
3

2
3
τσ
 1
σ

.
Both pbbpd and pnd are increasing functions of σ over the domain. The two
prices are clearly identical as σ → 0; moreover, pnd > pbbpd for σ = 1.
Provided that δ > 0:
lim
σ→0
pndpbbpd = (τσ)
1
σ
1
2

τσ(δ+3)
3

 1
σ
+ 1
6

1
3
τσ
	 1
σ + 1
3

2
3
τσ
	 1
σ
= 0+,
implying that pbbpd > pnd as σ → 0. Hence, we can conclude that the two
functions intersect for at least one value of σ ∈ (0, 1).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5
(i) As demand is inversely related to prices, the results follow from Propo-
sition 4 (i). In particular, as σ ∈ (0, 1), the function X
σ−1
σ is decreasing for
any value of the argument X; hence, for any given value of σ, the smaller
the argument, the larger X
σ−1
σ . But then τσ

1 + δ
3
	
≥ τσ > 2
3
τσ > 1
3
τσ
implies q1 ≤ q
nd < qo < qr. Finally, it can also be veriﬁed that if demand is
perfectly inelastic:
lim
σ→1

1
3
τσ
σ−1
σ
= lim
σ→1

2
3
τσ
σ−1
σ
= lim
σ→1
(τσ)
σ−1
σ = lim
σ→1

τσ

1 +
δ
3
σ−1
σ
= 1.
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(ii) The quantity consumed over two periods by a given switching con-
sumer is:
Qr =

τσ

1 +
δ
3
σ−1
σ
+

1
3
τσ
σ−1
σ
. (6)
The corresponding quantity consumed by a loyal consumer is:
Qo =

τσ

1 +
δ
3
σ−1
σ
+

2
3
τσ
σ−1
σ
, (7)
while any given consumer under no discrimination consumes:
Qnd = 2 (τσ)
σ−1
σ . (8)
Focus ﬁrst on (6) and (7). The ﬁrst term is identical in both but from point
(i) we know that qo < qr, σ ∈ (0, 1). Hence, Q
r > Qo. Turning to (7) and
(8), we can write the diﬀerence of the two as:
∆Q = Qo−Qnd =
τσ1 + δ3
σ−1
σ
− (τσ)
σ−1
σ  
A
+
23τσ
σ−1
σ
− (τσ)
σ−1
σ  
B
 ,
from part (i) we know that A ≤ 0 while B > 0. In case δ = 0 then the result is
obvious. If, instead, δ ∈ (0, 1], we consider once again the function X
σ−1
σ ; as
the function is decreasing in X then |A|−B =

2
3
τσ
	σ−1
σ −

τσ

1 + δ
3
	σ−1
σ <
0 implying ∆Q > 0.
(iii) The result descends immediately from point (ii). As the market is
covered under both no discrimination and BBPD and as both switchers and
loyal consumers consume over the two period more than any consumer un-
der no discrimination, then surely BBPD increases the overall quantity con-
sumed, or Qbbpd = 1
3
Qr + 2
3
Qo > Qnd.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6
(i) Consumers’ switching is independent of the demand elasticity as:
S = (x∗1 − x
∗
2A) + (x
∗
2B − x
∗
1) =

1
2
−
1
3

+

2
3
−
1
2

=
1
3
.
Turning to consumers’ surplus, under no discrimination it is identical in
both periods. The overall surplus is then:
OCSnd =

v −
5
4
τ

(1 + δ)
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Overall consumer surplus under BBPD is obtained as:
OCSbbpd = 2

1
2
0

v −

1 +
δ
3

τ − τx

dx

+2δ

1
3
0

v −
2
3
τ − τx

dx+
1
2
1
3

v −
1
3
τ − τ (1− x)

dx

= v (1 + δ)−
5
4
τ −
43
36
τδ
Both expressions are independent on σ and, clearly, ∀δ ∈ (0, 1] : OCSnd <
OCSbbpd.
(iii) The industry proﬁts under no discrimination are:
Πnd = (1 + δ) τσ
while under BBPD:
Πbbpd =
(8δ + 9)
9
τσ
so the diﬀerence is:
∆Π = Πbbpd − Πnd = −
1
9
στδ
which is clearly larger (in absolute value), the larger is σ; consequently, the
proﬁt diﬀerential is decreasing (in absolute value) with the elasticity of de-
mand.
(iii) From the previous points, total welfare under non-discrimination is:
W nd = Πnd +OCSnd
while under BBPD is:
W bbpd = Πbbpd +OCSbbpd
The welfare eﬀect of moving from non-discrimination to BBPD is:
∆W = W bbpd −W nd = −
1
18
τδ(2σ − 1)
hence ∆W > 0 for σ < 1
2
.
Q.E.D.
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